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KEY JUDGEMENTS 
US Intelligence Community faces qualitatively new environment after the Cold 
War when older means of intelligence gathering is challenged by Fourth 
Generation Warfare techniques that can’t be countered in traditional way. 
 Although there is no longer such an overwhelming threat like Warsaw 
Pact, there are new threats to US national security such as international 
terrorism, organized crime, drugs and human trafficking, illegal arms trade 
and increased threat of WMD proliferation. Traditional intelligence collection 
methods prove to be difficult to face this new challenge some of which can be 
further elaborated to be part of so called 4
th
 generation warfare.  
 Certain nation-states such as China and Russia still require attention from 
intelligence community. The list can be even extended to rogue states such as 
Iran, Syria, North Korea or Sudan. Even allied and partner countries may 
require attention too as Indian nuclear test of 1998 proves that. This fact 
emphasizes continued need for more advanced space-based intelligence 
gathering platforms.  
9/11 terrorist attacks surfaced the weaknesses within US national security 
system. As Congressional investigation shows there is a need for a better 
partnership between various security agencies that so far have been reluctant 
to work together. This NIE proposes three possible scenarios of such 
partnership. 
  Total integration of US national security system under single federal 
agency. This is the least likely scenario given the political culture of United 
States and history of relationship between involved agencies.  
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 Cooperation model is reserving more powers to newly established Director 
of National Intelligence. It would mean decrease in authority of individual 
agencies. Therefore this scenario also enjoys less chance of probability. 
 Collaboration model envisages individual agencies still retaining to their 
traditional powers but doing more information sharing and coordination under 
DNI. According to this NIE this last scenario is the most likely one.  
The problems faced by US post-Cold War intelligence community can be 
classified into two categories, being organizational, as discussed above, and 
technological. Despite the significant technological superiority enjoyed during the 
Cold-War, evolved circumstances make development of new technologies 
necessary to tackle old problems and to counter the qualitatively novel challenges. 
Arrival of Fourth Generation Warfare means traditional intelligence collection 
methods are either mostly irrelevant or hard to exploit because rival usually 
employs low-level technology and pays more attention to denial and deception. 
According to NIE changed face of warfare may force US intelligence community 
to choose one of the three possible scenarios: 
 Employing revolutionary ISR platforms, such as Future Imagery 
Architecture, to meet the new challenges by increased reliance on even higher 
level of technology. It would be a forward-looking strategic initiative which is 
not likely to happen because development of such systems will require multi-
billion investments that hardly will be approved by Congress, even in post 
9/11 environment. 
 Second scenario is shifting back to legacy systems as modern rivals make 
it hard to collect intelligence by sophisticated ISR platforms due to 
adversaries’ preference of lower level technology to deny information to the 
opponent. Return to legacy systems seems to be the least likely scenario. 
 The most likely scenario is US intelligence community will opt for 
mixture of the tactical and strategic intelligence collection methods. It will 
depend on the specific circumstances and decision will be made on case by 
case basis. It is about balancing strategic priorities versus tactical needs. At 
both levels there is still a growing need for more advanced space-born 
technologies.   
 
DISCUSSION 
Congressional investigation of 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed that actually there 
was some information available about possible attacks. These warnings even kept 
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rising since late 90s until summer 2001
1
. Informants within Al-Qaida even warned 
about possible attacks to World Trade Center or employing planes as missiles. 
Intelligence community was also informed about several terrorism suspects’ arrival 
to the country. Still terror act was not been prevented.   
When asked why one can arrive to a “wheat and chaff” dilemma which is a daily 
problem in intelligence community, meaning valuable information is so 
fragmented and spread out across such a broad spectrum that it is impossible to 
bring the pieces together and analyze them. Although intelligence analysis is not 
the area of concern to current NIE lack of imagination for analysts’ part certainly 
played a destructive role too. Although intelligence community did react to the 
warnings, analysts were not creative enough to imagine possibility of attack 
directly to continental US
2
. Better intelligence collection techniques might have 
compensated for analytical failure.  
One example to that is interception of communications between Al-Qaida 
members. Although some information traffic was detected as a general rule 
plotters observed a strict silence which made signals intelligence almost irrelevant. 
Even acquired pieces of information usually looked odd in the background of 
volume of communications being analyzed. More advanced software to track the 
communications traffic might have helped to concentrate on more important pieces 
of information lost in vast amount of data. 
Poor human intelligence, such as small number of informants within Al-Qaida and 
their questionable loyalty also added to the problem excluding possibility of 
HUMINT correcting shortcomings of SIGINT. But analytical deficiency was 
further exaggerated by non-cooperation between individual security agencies. 
Ideally different fields of intelligence should work together towards common 
target
3
. It is necessary because all the individual branches of intelligence gathering 
have own disadvantages. So the best decisions are made based on information 
gathered from as many sources as possible. However CIA, FBI and NSA all 
having access to pieces of valuable information failed to cooperate to prevent 
surprise attack. Have they shared the information available to them with one 
another there would be a more detailed picture which would help the analysts.  
                                                          
1 Senate and House Joint Inquiry Statement on the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks, pg 7 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_errata.pdf 
2 Ibid pg 8 
3 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fourth Edition). CQ Press. Washington 
DC 2005 (Paperback) 2009 pg 71 
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For all these reasons 9/11 terror attacks are not the result of simply analytical 
failure, it would be fair to suggest that they took place more because there were 
organizational and technological problems in US intelligence community that went 
unnoticed in post-Cold War era.  
Despite of the fact that Warsaw Pact doesn’t exist anymore national security 
environment for United States became even more complicated. While countries 
with nuclear arsenals like Russia and China still require attention others like North 
Korea and Iran try to develop ICBMs of their own. Even allied and partner 
countries such as Israel, India and Pakistan may require attention as India’s 
surprise nuclear test of 1998 proves it
4
.  
   However the most striking feature of post-Cold War era is increase of threat by 
non-state actors like terrorists and organized crime. As 9/11 events and military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan teach it is these non-traditional rivals that pose 
more serious threat to US national security. What makes these groups so dangerous 
is that they are employing 4
th
 generation warfare techniques. 
Although this NIE is not a supposed to be a military research paper it would be 
useful briefly to touch the issue of warfare generations as it affects so heavily the 
way how intelligence is collected nowadays. It is believed that warfare techniques 
went through three generations. The first generation is the time when militaries 
used muskets and soldiers lined up to maximize the fire power
5
. Both 
technological factors and social conditions shaped each generation. Second 
generation was marked with introduction of indirect fire and rapid movement. 
Mass firepower replaced importance of mass manpower, this was the primary 
difference
6
. Third generation warfare was heavily dictated by ideas and immediate 
needs, realities rather than technologies. The concept of Blitzkrieg that was 
developed by Germany already by the end of 1918 is a good example of ideas 
driven warfare
7
. Each generation was different from previous one in terms of even 
wider projection of power.  
Analysis of conflicts after WW II show that the next generation is likely to be 
highly technology driven and encompass entire society of the adversary
8
. High-
                                                          
4 George, Roger Z and Bruce, James B Analyzing Intelligence Georgetown University Press. 2008 
 
5 Lind, William S. and Col. Keith Nightengale, USA, Capt. John F Schmitt, USMC, Col. Joseph 
W.Sutton, USA, and LtCol. Gary I Wilson, USMC. “The Changing Face of War: Into the 
Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 1989 pg 23 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid  
8 Ibid pg 24 
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tech nature of 4
th
 generation warfare is manifested in current “smart bombs” or 
space-enhanced military operations. However it is likely to go even further by 
militaries concentrating on electronic and cyber attacks or jamming the adversary’s 
telecommunications satellites to paralyze its force. Prospect of more advanced 
technologies and efficient military systems such as space based weapons will 
reduce the number of combatants involved in the conflict. Future militaries will be 
more about technically high skilled professionals that will be more flexible and 
mobile than contemporary armed forces. Quality will overwhelm quantity. No 
wonder that amount of C3D2 employed by rivals will increase significantly by as 
early as 2015
9
.  
4
th
 generation warfare also affects the entire society of the adversary trying to 
degrade the social, economic and military infrastructure. It is about winning the 
minds of adversary and neutral or allied international community. So it would be 
correct to conclude that fourth generation war is also an information warfare. It is 
about changing the opinion how adversary, allies and neutrals think about the war 
and themselves in general. Information warfare is not just about reaching one’s 
message to the audience but is also about persuading the opposition that conflict 
can’t be won militarily. High-tech nature of modern warfare is not just manifested 
in “smart” bombs it is also about skills to use means of multimedia in one’s own 
advantage. 
As recent developments show 4
th
 generation has technological and social aspect. 
Depending how advanced the adversary is it can emphasize the former or latter 
aspect. While anti-satellite missile test of China stresses the technological aspect, 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 or suicide bombs in Middle East are examples of 
technologically inferior adversary trying to achieve political means by information 
warfare, by spreading the message and targeting the entire society. Moreover 
unlike traditional militaries terrorists of 9/11 and insurgents in Middle East 
deliberately avoided intense communications or fixed headquarters and camps to 
deny intelligence collection. Although weaker in terms of force tactics employed 
by insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq may prove to be more dangerous if exploited 
by more advanced militaries such as that of China, Russia or India.  
US intelligence community was not prepared enough neither technologically,  nor 
organizationally to face this new type of challenge. The most destructive reality 
was existence of competition and stovepipes- distinction of intelligence agencies 
based on technical and non-technical collection methods. Usually any given 
intelligence branch is constrained by certain other factors too, such as budget, 
                                                          
9 Diamond John M. “Re-examining Problems and Prospects in US Imagery Intelligence” pg. 61 
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limited number of ISR satellites, competing priorities, need to protect the source of 
information and identifying the most relevant information among the stream of 
data
10
. Among these factors prioritization is becoming more and more visible 
issue. It expresses itself as tactical needs versus strategic objectives. Intelligence 
collection serves both long-term and short-term needs. While Cold War period 
more stressed the need for strategic planning and intelligence gathering that aimed 
at that, current landscape is not about global political competition between two 
superpowers. Short-term regional armed conflicts make tactical needs of military 
more pressing issue. But on the other hand nation-states like Iran carrying out 
underground nuclear research reminds that strategic intelligence gathering is still 
important. Both levels require technological improvements. This NIE finds it 
useful to zoom more in depth into different intelligence collection disciplines to 
have a broader idea what they are expected to do and what the problems are that 
they face. 
HUMINT or human intelligence is usually about sending trained intelligence 
officers to the denied areas, as in case of H.K. Roy in Sarajevo
11
. His mission was 
to collect information but in most cases HUMINT is more about appointing some 
intelligence chiefs in country of interest who would then recruit informants among 
locals. It is the informants who usually do the actual espionage. Usually appointing 
intelligence officers abroad involves inventing pseudo names and cover stories to 
give them a plausible reason for living in the area of interest. It is easier if 
intelligence officers enter the country under the cover of diplomatic activity, such 
as chief officer Hathaway who was the case officer for the Tolkachev
12
. But such 
operations may cause controversy if the officer is intercepted by the counter-
intelligence of host country.  
As Cold-War experience in West Germany shows open nature of democratic 
societies make it easier for adversaries like Stasi to recruit assets of their own by 
exploiting the basic human weaknesses of even staunch anti-communists like Hans 
Rehner
13
. Need for more effective counter-intelligence and intelligence network 
within hard to penetrate targets like terrorist groups calls for more attention to 
                                                          
10 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fourth Edition). CQ Press. Washington 
DC 2005 (Paperback) 2009 pg 53 
11 Roy H.K, “Betrayal in the Balkans” Intelligencer: Journal of US Intelligence Studies, Volume 12, 
No 1 (Summer 2001) pg 45 
12 Royden, Barry G., “Tolkachev, A Noteworthy Successor to Penkovsky,” Studies in Intelligence, 
Vol.47 No 3 (2003)  
13 Macrakis Kristie, “The Case of Agent Gorbachev”, Intelligencer: The Journal of US Intelligence 
Studies, Vol. 12 No 1 (Summer 2001) pg 11 
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HUMINT. Traditionally CIA was in charge of clandestine HUMINT operations 
overseas, whereas FBI more concentrating on domestic counter-intelligence. 
TECHINT is the term referring to technical intelligence collection disciplines that 
further break down to SIGINT (signals intelligence), IMINT (images intelligence) 
and MASINT (measurement and signature intelligence). 
The primary security organization in charge of SIGINT in United States is the 
National Security Agency. Usually intercepted signals are about two-way 
communications. That is why COMINT- communications intelligence is 
considered to be part to SIGINT. Signals intelligence is a struggle between 
cryptographers and counter-intelligence encoders that try to code the 
communications signals to prevent interception
14
.  TELINT- telemetry intelligence 
and ELINT-electronic intelligence are also sub-branches of signals intelligence and 
helpful to analyze the weapons testing or picking the ranges of frequencies that 
enemy uses. Disclosures of most United States SIGINT capabilities made denial 
and deception techniques of adversaries even more sophisticated. There is a need 
for more advanced systems on ground and space-born platforms to maintain US 
dominance in the field. As 9/11 example proves part of the problem was NSA 
being overwhelmed by stream of data.  
Another major technical intelligence collection discipline is imagery intelligence. 
IMINT is a field where US traditionally enjoyed superiority compared to rivals by 
initiating the CORONA program- series of spy satellites. Although IMINT is 
coined with the name PHOTOINT- photo intelligence, only some portion of 
imagery intelligence comes from electro-optical systems. IMINT is usually about 
exploiting radars on satellites to penetrate the clouds, the most advanced of which 
is SAR- synthetic aperture radar being capable of day and night multiple detailed 
scan of area of interest. Usually satellites concentrate on infrared bands of the 
electromagnetic radiation. They “see” the warm objects that radiate infrared waves. 
Major improvements in the field are introduction of multispectral and 
hyperspectral imagery that allows satellites to provide more detailed images of the 
targets by analyzing more than one band of spectrum
15
. Current US IMINT 
capabilities are provided by 5 high-resolution satellites, 3 advanced KH-11 series 
spy satellites and 2 Lacrosse type radar imagers
16
. NRO- National Reconnaissance 
Office is responsible for development and acquisition of IMINT satellites, while 
                                                          
14 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fourth Edition). CQ Press. Washington 
DC 2005 (Paperback) 2009 pg 65 
15 Ibid pg 61 
16 Diamond John M. “Re-examining Problems and Prospects in US Imagery Intelligence” pg 62 
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NIMA- National Imagery and Mapping Agency is in charge of dissemination, 
tasking, exploiting and distribution of raw imagery provided by satellites.  
Wide range of post-Cold War areas of interest, such as nation states applying more 
complicated denial and deception to short-term battlefield requirements call for 
increase in number of satellites deployed in orbit. There is also demand for 
qualitative change too. Shift from long-term strategic priorities to short-term 
tactical needs of warfighter require brand new type of satellites. 
MASINT is another branch of technical intelligence that encompasses everything 
not covered by SIGINT or IMINT. MASINT detects, track, identifies and 
describes the object of interest by measuring the signature of the past activity
17
. 
Defense Intelligence Agency is the main security office concentrated on this field.  
It is debatable if MASINT an independent discipline or sub-branch of SIGINT and 
IMINT. 
Although counter intuitive to the nature of intelligence gathering after collapse of 
communism open source information has grown so much that new branch of 
intelligence collection emerged, named OPINT- open source intelligence. It is 
enough to mention that 80% of the valuable information about Russia is open-
source
18
. Usually high volume of information available on academic publications, 
mass media and internet require establishment of special research and analysis 
departments in charge of OPINT.  
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
Post 9/11 environment stressed the necessity of more cooperation between 
intelligence agencies. There are calls for an “integrated collection enterprise” 
meaning coordinated target development, collection and data management, 
planning, investment and development of new techniques
19
. Directorate of 
National Intelligence is supposed to be the overarching body that serves as the 
forum where all the other 16 individual agencies can do information sharing and 
discuss the issues on agenda. It is more of a collaboration model than integration or 
deeper cooperation. Current flow of events even after the 9/11, points to the fact 
that individual agencies are not likely to be integrated into single intelligence 
                                                          
17 George Roger Z. and Kleine, Robert D. (Eds) Intelligence and National Security Strategist. 
Macartney, John “John, How Should We Explain MASINT?” pg 69 
18 Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Fourth Edition). CQ Press. Washington 
DC 2005 (Paperback) 2009 pg 69 
19 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction March 2005 pg 357  
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/report/chapter7_fm.pdf 
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department. Powers of DNI are not so far-reaching either to allow it supervise very 
strong agencies such as NSA or CIA that would resist to give up their powers. 
Battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan show how enemy can avoid traditional 
intelligence collection methods by just preferring low-tech communications. 
SIGINT satellites at times fail to intercept them. IMINT is also of not much help 
because insurgents or international terrorism doesn’t have fixed headquarters or 
any place where they might be bound to. Even nation states such as Iran prefer 
new ways of denial by moving its nuclear program deep underground.    
This makes US either to shift to simpler forms of intelligence gathering such as 
legacy systems to “listen” to short-range radio transmissions of insurgents in 
Afghanistan or sophisticate current SIGINT and IMINT satellites to an extent that 
they can tune to low technology communications or “see” the underground targets. 
As for now US intelligence community doesn’t look like neither to give up 
operating current platforms in favor of legacy systems nor tends to revolutionize 
the satellites to costly levels. Current trends in technology development aim to 
address the pressing tactical needs at affordable rates.  
Moving Target Indicator program of NRO is one of the examples
20
. MTI program 
is essential for warfighther because current ISR capabilities stress reconnaissance 
over surveillance, surveillance meaning real time observation of the objects of 
interest. Current IMINT satellites provide only the snapshot of the enemy troops 
but it takes too long to reach the friendly forces in battlefield and usually 
impractical if target is rapidly changing its location. Identification of moving 
objects is necessary for PNT- positioning, navigation and timing capability too. 
PNT can be further elaborated as the precision strike by space enhancement. 
“Smart bombs” are one example.  
NRO tries not to lose the strategic grasp either. To improve efficiency commercial 
remote sensing is increasingly favored
21
. Even more ambitious approach was 
multi-billion Future Imagery Architecture program that intended develop small 
satellites based ISR to cut the overall costs in long run. 
Another agency that amassed multi-billion projects is the NSA. In late 90s 
National Security Agency tried to undergo both technological and management 
                                                          
20 Diamond John M. “Re-examining Problems and Prospects in US Imagery Intelligence”      pg 59 
21 Ibid pg 60 
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reforms to improve its performance
22
. Especially there was a need for improved 
software to scan the communications traffic in search of important information.   
As facts point US intelligence collection is neither going to shift to legacy systems 
to adapt low-tech nature of warfare in Middle East nor is it always favoring tactical 
priorities over strategic interests. It is rather mixture of both, gradually gravitating 
towards more advanced space-borne systems to meet the needs at strategic and 
tactical levels.  
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The article focuses on the intelligence collection as a subfield of overall national security 
activity. Although main focus is on United States experience most of the conclusions it 
makes can be true for other countries too. One of such conclusions is that both United 
States and all the coalition members in Iraq and Afghanistan indeed fight Fourth 
Generation Warfare. Struggle against transnational terrorism is just only one manifestation 
of absolutely new generation of warfare. New type of warfare can be also applied by 
nation-states too, in this article provides the list of such rogue states purely from American 
perspective while realities maybe different for other countries. While new generation of 
war has already arrived it caught most of the countries unprepared. Article drives specific 
examples from 9/11 to prove how specifically intelligence collection failed in that sense.  
 
